I mainly work in epistemology both traditional and applied. In particular, I am interested in the notions of evidence and risk, and how these interact with various topics in epistemology, ethics, and the law. My work is, and has been, funded by ARHC, ERC. You can find a list of my published papers here.
While I like to think and write about various issues, I am currently working on three projects: Externalism, evidence, and the law. This project aims to bring together some of my work on the nature and normativity of evidence with some work in evidence-law. First, it develops a theory on which knowledge doesn't always require evidence or even epistemic justification. Second, it looks at the social and legal consequences of this view. In particular, by focusing on victims of trauma, I ask: when should we ask for evidence? When should we believe people who are unable to provide evidence for their claims? What are the consequences for the current legal evidentiary standards used to assess the credibility of the testimony offered by victims of trauma, e.g., sexual assault cases and asylum seekers? As part of the Varieties of Risk Project (AHRC), I have organised a workshop on Risk and the Law that touched on some of these topics, in collaboration with the Edinburgh Legal Theory Group. You can find details of the event here. Digital Knowledge. I am currently working as part of the AHRC-funded Digital Knowledge Project, with Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, and Joshua Thorpe. As part of this project, we look at how virtue epistemology can be useful in tackling some of the challenges that arise for knowledge production and knowledge transmission in the digital sphere. My work on this project include an investigation into whether and how we can rationally avoid misleading evidence from a "spoiled digital environment"; an investigation into the threat posed by using AI in various settings, e.g., law. My work on this topic stems from the Ethics and Epistemology of Artificial Intelligence seminar that I have organised at the Hong Kong Catastrophic Risk Centre. Internalism and Externalism in Feminist Philosophy (with Joshua Rowan Thorpe). This project brings the internalism/externalism debate to various concepts that are central to feminist philosophy. The central idea is that while there has been much discussion of concepts such as consent, sexual assault, misogyny, mansplaining and micro-aggression, little attention has been paid to the question of whether and to what degree these concepts are internalist/externalist. The working hypothesis of the project is that we should prefer a robustly externalist view of many of the concepts of feminist philosopy. |